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A number of experimental studies have found that females are more competitively
inclined than males, and it has been argued that this difference potentially can explain a
wide range of real world economic phenomena, including observed gender differences
in labor markets (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Flory et al., 2010; Gneezy et al., 2003;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2011; Sutter and Ru¨tzler,
2010). Recent evidence suggests that the gender difference in willingness to compete
largely reflects cultural norms, which has been seen as providing justification for gen-
der equalizing public policies aiming at eliminating this asymmetry between males and
females (Gneezy et al., 2009).
The Scandinavian countries have for a long time pursued such policies, and are today
considered among the most gender equal societies in the world; in fact, Norway ranks
highest on the UN gender equality index comprising measures of educational attainment,
labor market participation and health.1 Still, in a large lab experiment conducted with
adolescents in Norway, we find a substantial gender difference in the willingness to com-
pete, in line with what has been observed in Sweden (Ca´rdenas et al., 2012). We argue
that these observations from Scandinavia provide a challenge to the gender policy debate,
namely how to view preference differences in free and gender equal societies. Economists
have traditionally assigned great importance to respecting individual preferences, as ex-
emplified by the recent literature on libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008),
but have been more willing to consider policies that nudge people in a particular direc-
tion if this is to overcome a particular behavioral bias, for example when individuals hold
incorrect beliefs about their own abilities.
A related important policy question is whether the gender difference in willingness to
compete reflects that females compete too little or males compete too much. Clearly, the
answer to this question will be crucial in determining the extent to which public policies
in this area should target females or males. But this is not a straightforward problem to
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analyze, since the decision of whether or not to enter into competition typically involves
important uncertainties: an individual may be unsure about her own ability to perform and
about the level of competition. In such a complex choice situation, what should be the
metric for whether a person should have competed or not? And how should we measure
the corresponding economic gains or costs of making any particular choice?
The present paper addresses these issues, where we report from the above-mentioned
lab experiment conducted on a representative sample of Norwegian adolescents, 14 to 15
years old. We show that even though the long history of gender equalizing policies in
Norway has not eliminated gender differences in willingness to compete, it appears to
have made young males and females similar in a wide range of other domains. In par-
ticular, we do not find any gender difference in confidence. Our study opens up for two
very different policy responses. One response is to argue that the data provides evidence
for gender equalizing policies being very successful, and consequently view a continua-
tion of such policies as an appropriate strategy to remove the difference in willingness to
compete. Alternatively one might argue that the apparent success of these policies should
be taken as evidence for males and females being treated as equals in Norway, and thus
view it as appropriate to respect any remaining gender differences in preferences.
The second contribution of the paper is to show that the choice of metric for measuring
whether a person should have competed or not is important. We consider two possible
approaches, the ex post approach and the ex ante approach. When applying the ex post
approach, we find, in line with the existing literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007),
that too few females compete (under-entry) and too many males compete (over-entry). If,
however, we take the ex ante approach, we find that there is substantial under-entry into
competition both among males and females (measured relative to what would maximize
an individual’s expected income). In fact, with this approach, we find hardly any evidence
of over-entry among the participants. With both approaches, we find that females are
significantly less willing to exploit the potential gains from competition, and this remains
the case even when controlling for confidence, risk preferences, and other experimental
variables. This suggests that differences in preferences for competition are fundamental
in explaining gender differences in outcomes.
1 Sample and design
Our sample is 9th grade students in Norway, who were recruited from randomly selected
schools in Bergen municipality, which is largely representative for Norway. At each
school, we randomly selected some classes, and all students in these classes received
a personal invitation to participate in the experiment. Out of 603 invited students from
nine schools, 523 took part in the experiment, giving us a mean participation rate of 87%.
Since the 9th grade is compulsory in Norway, with hardly any dropout, we consider the
sample to be representative for this age group in Norway.2 To ensure control over the
experimental situation, all participants were transported by bus from their schools to a lab
at NHH Norwegian School of Economics. On average 50 students participated in each
2This is confirmed by what we find when comparing family background data for our sample with na-
tional data. The distribution of income and education of the parents to the participants in our sample is in
line with official statistics for Norway. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Alma˚s et al. (2012).
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session and we had ten sessions that lasted for approximately two hours.
The experimental design used to measure preferences for competitiveness is similar to
the design in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).3 Participants were asked to add sets of four
two-digit numbers over a three-minute period and they earned one point for each correct
answer. After receiving the instructions about the real effort task, but before working on
it, the participants were asked to state the fraction of participants they believed would do
better than themselves on the task. The difference between the participant’s response and
his or her actual performance gives us an individual measure of overconfidence.
The real effort task was done twice, in each round lasting for three minutes. In the
first round, the participants worked under a competitive tournament scheme, where they
earned 50 NOK (approximately 8.5 USD) if they got at least as many point as the aver-
age score in the same session, otherwise, they received nothing. Without receiving any
feedback on their own or others productivity in the first round, they were then told to do
the same task again. This time they were asked to choose between a fixed piece rate of
1 NOK per correct answer or a competitive pay, where they received 3 NOK per correct
answer if they scored at least as many points as the average in the first round.
In addition to the experiment designed to measure competitiveness, we also conducted
other experiments that measured the participants’ risk preferences, time preferences and
social preferences. After all the incentivized parts of the experiment were completed, par-
ticipants also answered the 44-item Big Five Inventory (John et al., 1991). All payments,
except payments from the time preference experiment, were made in cash at the end of
the session, and special care was taken to ensure anonymity in the payment procedure.
2 Results
From Table 1, we observe that 41 percent of the participants in our sample choose to
compete. Males are considerably more likely to select into competition than females, 51.1
percent versus 31.0 percent. This large difference is striking in light of the fact that we
find only a small difference in the performance of males and females on the experimental
task, and no significant gender differences in any of the other experimental variables. In
particular, females are as overconfident as males, and there are also no gender differences
in risk preferences, time preferences or social preferences. Thus, Table 1 may be seen as
providing evidence for the long history of gender equalizing policies in Norway making
females and males very similar, except with respect to willingness to compete.
An important question, in light of the striking gender difference in selection into com-
petition, is whether this reflects that females compete too little or males compete too
much. In studying this question, we follow Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and focus on
whether the participant decided to compete when doing so would maximize his or her
income. We use two different approaches to determine the metric in this analysis, the
ex post approach and the ex ante approach. The ex post approach defines that a person
should have competed if his or her performance in the second round was greater than the
average performance in the first round (which was the benchmark in the competition),
whereas everyone who performs worse in the second round should have chosen not to
compete. Panel A in Table 2 shows the number of participants, broken down by gender,
3Experimental instructions can be found in a web-appendix.
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Table 1: Overview of gender differences
mean standard deviation p-value
Males Females Males Females (equal means) N
Variables pertaining to the competition experiment
Compete 0.511 0.310 0.501 0.463 < 0.001 523
Performance 10.95 9.71 4.92 4.36 0.003 523
Overconfidence 0.041 0.086 2.76 2.97 0.857 523
Other experimental measures
Risk 3.64 3.59 2.31 2.18 0.802 523
Patience 8.45 8.27 3.95 3.75 0.600 523
Egalitarian 0.280 0.259 0.450 0.439 0.588 523
Altruism 0.300 0.322 0.246 0.229 0.311 517
Note: “Compete” is an indicator variable (1: participant chose to compete, 0: participant did not com-
pete), “Performance” indicates how many correct answers the participant had in the real-effort task in the
first round, “Overconfidence” indicates the difference between what the participant believes about own per-
formance and actual performance (reported in deciles) “Risk” indicates how many times the gamble was
chosen over the certain alternative, “Patience” indicates how many times the participant chose to wait when
choosing between money amounts spaced three weeks apart, “Egalitarian” is an indicator variable (1: the
participant, as a spectator, shared equally between two players with different production in a dictator game,
0: the participant did not share equally), “Altruism” is the share given to another participant as dictator
in a situation with equal production, where the slightly lower number of observations reflects matching
problems in session with odd number of participants.
who, according to the ex post approach, should and should not have chosen to compete,
where we observe that over-entry is more common for males and that under-entry is more
common for females.
This ex post classification does, however, not take account of the fact that the par-
ticipants made their decision under uncertainty about own performance and about the
performance of others. The ex ante approach, on the other hand, takes this uncertainty
into account, and defines that a person should have competed if this maximized the partic-
ipant’s expected income.4 From Panel B in Table 2, we observe that the ex ante approach
provides us with a very different picture of the selection into competition than the ex post
4The expected income from choosing to compete is given by
∑
y
∑
x
3y ·Pi(Y2 = y)P(Y 1 = x)1(y≥ x),
where Pi(Y2 = y) is the probability for the participant’s production in round two Y2 being equal to y and
P(Y 1 = x) is the probability for average production in round one being x, and 1(·) is the indicator function.
To evaluate a normal approximation of P(Y 1 = x), we use the standard error of the mean in each session
in the first round; to evaluate P(Y 1 = x), we estimate a Poisson count model on the performance data for
both rounds, where we include dummies for gender and whether a person worked under a competitive
tournament scheme, and the interaction between these variables. The estimated Poisson count model can
also be used to evaluate the the expected income from working for a fixed piece rate, which is given by
∑
y
y ·Pi(Y2 = y).
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Table 2: Under- and overentry into competition
Should compete
Males Females
A. Chose to compete (ex post) no yes no yes
no 72 59 98 78
yes 47 90 23 56
B. Chose to compete (ex ante)
no 21 110 30 146
yes 10 127 4 75
Note: The panels show how many participants who chose to compete and how many participants who
chose not to compete, by whether they should have competed. A person is said to should have competed if
doing so would have maximized ex post income given the actual performance in the second round and the
actual average performance in the first round (Panel A), or if this would have maximized expected income
according to the model outlined in footnote 4 (Panel B).
approach, showing substantial under-entry among both males and females. Further, with
the ex ante approach, we find hardly any evidence of over-entry among the participants.
The explanation for the stark difference between these two approaches is that by taking
into account the uncertainty involved in choosing competition, the nonlinear structure of
the payoff scheme becomes important. In particular, in expected income terms, a small
probability of succeeding in the competition might outweigh a higher probability of fail-
ing. Consequently, even participants who expect to perform worse in round two than
the average performance in round one may maximize their expected income by choosing
competition.
The ex ante approach and ex post approach support very different conclusions about
the male participants, the ex ante approach suggests that males, on average, compete too
little, whereas the ex post approach suggests that males, on average, compete too much.
For the females, however, the two approaches coincide and both support the conclusion
that females, on average, compete too little. Clearly, both approaches also show that
under-entry is a greater problem among females than males, which means that females
to a lesser extent than males take advantage of the potential gains from entering into
competition.
We now turn to a discussion of how the gains or losses associated with the choice
of whether to compete or not are associated with gender, confidence, and background
variables. Also when evaluating gains and losses, we adopt both the ex ante approach
and the ex post approach. The ex post approach measures the gain as the difference
between the income from the alternative chosen and the income from the alternative not
chosen, assuming that the performance would have been the same for both alternatives.
The ex ante approach, on the other hand, measures the gain as the difference between the
expected income from the alternative chosen and the expected income from the alternative
not chosen. Table 3 reports regressions of the gains from the competition choice on gender
and different background variables.
We observe that independent of which approach we apply and whether we include
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Table 3: Gains from competition choice
Ex ante gains Ex post gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
female -5.929∗∗∗ -5.433∗∗∗ -5.805∗∗∗ -4.223∗∗ -3.659∗ -4.025∗∗
(1.502) (1.475) (1.481) (1.944) (1.923) (2.005)
overconfidence 0.832∗ 0.681 1.121∗ 1.000
(0.448) (0.463) (0.610) (0.646)
Female × overconfidence 1.749∗∗∗ 1.690∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗ 1.475∗∗
(0.554) (0.554) (0.676) (0.686)
Additional controls:
Experimental controls no no yes no no yes
Observations 523 523 523 523 523 523
R2 0.234 0.278 0.313 0.138 0.170 0.193
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between the income from the alternative chosen minus
the income from the alternative not chosen. In (1)-(3), this is measured in expected income, as outlined
in footnote 4, whereas in (4)-(6) it is measured in ex post income. The experimental controls are those
listed in Table 1: Risk preferences, time preferences, and social preferences, in addition to the personality
measures from the Big-5 inventory. Also included, but not reported, are fixed effects for each level of
round one performance and an indicator variable for missing observations on social preferences. Standard
errors in parentheses (∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗ p< 0.01).
controls for individual beliefs and other background variables, we estimate a significant
loss for the females. We interpret this loss as capturing the economic cost of the observed
gender difference in willingness to compete. Interestingly, we also observe that being
overconfident, particularly for females, is beneficial, which reflects that overconfidence
counteracts the general tendency of under-entry into competition.
3 Policy dilemmas
The results from our experiment show that there is a substantial difference in the willing-
ness to compete among adolescent males and females in one of the most gender equal
societies in the world. We have also shown that this gender difference reduces the girls’
economic gain from the experiment. Potentially, this pattern may also repeat itself out-
side the lab where these adolescents soon are to make important educational and career
choices. What should be the policy response to this scenario?
We argue that our analysis highlights two fundamental questions in the debate about
gender equalization policies in liberal societies. The first question is to what extent it is
legitimate to design policies that aim to eliminate gender differences in preferences for
competition. How we answer this question might depend on the true nature of individual
preferences and the role of society in shaping our preferences. While many would find it
illegitimate to manipulate preferences if they are fully autonomous, such paternalistic in-
terventions might be more legitimate if preferences to a large extent are shaped by family
background, peer pressure, and other circumstances. The second question is to what ex-
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tent it is legitimate to manipulate individuals’ beliefs about their own abilities. The answer
to this question is likely to depend on whether peoples’ beliefs are correct or not. While
it seems possible to reconcile the ideals of a liberal society with manipulations that make
beliefs more correct, there seems to be a fundamental tension between liberal ideals and
manipulations that make peoples’ beliefs less correct. The results from our experiment
point to the possibility that manipulating people to become overconfident might improve
economic outcomes by counteracting a tendency to compete too little. Such possibilities
create situations where there is a difficult trade-off between liberal ideals and economic
outcomes.
References
Alma˚s, Ingvild, Alexander W. Cappelen, Kjell G. Salvanes, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil
Tungodden (2012). “Willingness to compete: Familly matters”, NHH Discussion Pa-
pers SAM 23/2012.
Balafoutas, Loukas and Matthias Sutter (2012). “Affirmative action policies promote
women and do not harm efficiency in the laboratory”, Science, 335(6068): 579–582.
Ca´rdenas, Juan-Camilo, Anna Dreber, Emma von Essen, and Eva Ranehill (2012). “Gen-
der differences in competitiveness and risk taking: Comparing children in colombia
and sweden”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1): 11–23.
Flory, Jeffrey, Andreas Leibbrandt, and John List (2010). “Do competitive work places
deter female workers? a large-scale natural field experiment on gender differences in
job-entry decisions”, NBER Working Paper Series w16546.
Gneezy, Uri, Kenneth L. Leonard, and John A. List (2009). “Gender differences in com-
petition: Evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society”, Econometrica, 77(5):
1637–1664.
Gneezy, Uri, Muriel Niederle, and Aldo Rustichini (2003). “Performance in competive
environments: Gender differences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 1049–
1074.
Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini (2004). “Gender and competition at a young age”, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 94(2): 378–381.
John, O. P., E. M. Donahue, and R. L. Kentle (1991). “The Big Five Inventory—versions
4a and 54”, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Personality
and Social Research.
Niederle, Muriel and Lise Vesterlund (2007). “Do women shy away from competition?
Do men compete too much?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3): 1067–1101.
Niederle, Muriel and Lise Vesterlund (2011). “Gender and competition”, Annual Review
of Economics, 3(1): 601–630.
7
Sunstein, Cass and Richard Thaler (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness, Yale University Press.
Sutter, Matthias and Daniela Ru¨tzler (2010). “Gender differences in competition emerge
early in life”, IZA Discussion Papeer No. 5015.
8
 
 Issued in the series Discussion Papers 2011 
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
01/11 January,  Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge, Kjetil Bjorvatn, and Bertil Tungodden, 
“Human and financial capital for microenterprise development: Evidence 
from a field and lab experiment.” 
 
02/11 February, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Quality 
competition with profit constraints: do non-profit firms provide higher quality 
than for-profit firms?” 
 
03/11 February, Gernot Doppelhofer and Melvyn Weeks, “Robust Growth 
Determinants”. 
 
04/11 February, Manudeep Bhuller, Magne Mogstad, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Life-
Cycle Bias and the Returns to Schooling in Current and Lifetime Earnings”. 
 
05/11 March, Knut Nygaard, "Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway". 
 
06/11 March, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y., “Negotiation under possible third party 
settlement”. 
 
07/11 April, Fred Schroyen, “Attitudes towards income risk in the presence of 
quantity constraints”. 
 
08/11 April, Craig Brett and Laurence Jacquet, “Workforce or Workfare?” 
 
09/11 May, Bjørn Basberg, “A Crisis that Never Came. The Decline of the European 
Antarctic Whaling Industry in the 1950s and -60s”. 
 
10/11 June, Joseph A. Clougherty, Klaus Gugler, and Lars Sørgard, “Cross-Border 
Mergers and Domestic Wages: Integrating Positive ‘Spillover’ Effects and 
Negative ‘Bargaining’ Effects”. 
 
11/11 July, Øivind A. Nilsen, Arvid Raknerud, and Terje Skjerpen, “Using the 
Helmert-transformation to reduce dimensionality in a mixed model: 
Application to a wage equation with worker and …rm heterogeneity”. 
 
12/11 July, Karin Monstad, Carol Propper, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Is teenage 
motherhood contagious? Evidence from a Natural Experiment”. 
 
 13/11 August, Kurt R. Brekke, Rosella Levaggi, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune 
Straume, “Patient Mobility, Health Care Quality and Welfare”. 
 
14/11 July, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y.,  “Fairness motivation in bargaining”. 
 
15/11 September, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y, Alexander Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, 
and Bertil Tungodden, “Immoral criminals? An experimental study of social 
preferences among prisoners”. 
 
16/11 September, Hans Jarle Kind, Guttorm Schjelderup, and Frank Stähler, 
“Newspaper Differentiation and Investments in Journalism: The Role of Tax 
Policy”. 
 
17/11 Gregory Corcos, Massimo Del Gatto, Giordano Mion, and Gianmarco I.P. 
Ottaviano, “Productivity and Firm Selection: Quantifying the "New" Gains 
from Trade”. 
 
18/11 Grant R. McDermott and Øivind Anti Nilsen, “Electricity Prices, River 
Temperatures and Cooling Water Scarcity”. 
 
19/11 Pau Olivella and Fred Schroyen, “Multidimensional screening in a 
monopolistic insurance market”. 
 
20/11 Liam Brunt, “Property rights and economic growth: evidence from a natural 
experiment”. 
 
21/11 Pau Olivella and Fred Schroyen, “Multidimensional screening in a 
monopolistic insurance market: proofs”. 
 
22/11 Roger Bivand, “After “Raising the Bar”: applied maximum likelihood 
estimation of families of models in spatial econometrics”. 
 
23/11 Roger Bivand, “Geocomputation and open source software:components and 
software stacks”. 
 
24/11 Simon P.Anderson, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind and Martin Peitz, “Media 
market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices”. 
 
25/11 Liam Brunt, Johs Lerner, and Tom Nicholas, “Inducement Prizes and 
Innovation”. 
 
26/11 Øivind Anti Nilsen and Katrine Holm Reiso, “Scarring effects of 
unemployment”. 
 2012 
 
 
01/12 February, Ola Honningdal Grytten, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism the Haugian Way”. 
 
02/12 February, Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune Jansen Hagen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, 
and Bertil Tungodden, «Do non-enforceable contracts matter? Evidence from 
an international lab experiment”. 
 
03/12 February, Alexander W. Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden, “Tax policy and 
fair inequality”. 
 
04/12 March, Mette Ejrnæs and Astrid Kunze, «Work and Wage Dynamics around 
Childbirth”. 
 
05/12 March, Lars Mathiesen, “Price patterns resulting from different producer 
behavior in spatial equilibrium”. 
 
06/12 March, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Hospital 
competition with soft budgets”. 
 
07/12 March,  Alexander W. Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden, “Heterogeneity in 
fairness views - a challenge to the mutualistic approach?” 
 
08/12 March, Tore Ellingsen and Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, “Paying for Staying: 
Managerial Contracts and the Retention Motive”. 
 
09/12 March, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Can 
competition reduce quality?” 
 
10/12 April, Espen Bratberg, Øivind Anti Nilsen, and Kjell Vaage, “Is Recipiency of 
Disability Pension Hereditary?” 
 
11/12 May, Lars Mathiesen, Øivind Anti Nilsen, and Lars Sørgard, “A Note on 
Upward Pricing Pressure: The possibility of false positives”. 
 
12/12 May, Bjørn L. Basberg, “Amateur or professional? A new look at 19th century 
patentees in Norway”. 
 
13/12 May, Sandra E. Black, Paul J. Devereux, Katrine V. Løken, and Kjell G. 
Salvanes, “Care or Cash? The Effect of Child Care Subsidies on Student 
Performance”. 
 
14/12 July, Alexander W. Cappelen, Ulrik H. Nielsen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil 
Tungodden, and Jean-Robert Tyran, “ Give and Take in Dictator Games”. 
 
 15/12 August, Kai Liu, “Explaining the Gender Wage Gap: Estimates from a 
Dynamic Model of Job Changes and Hours Changes”. 
 
16/12 August, Kai Liu, Kjell G. Salvanes, and Erik Ø. Sørensen, «Good Skills in 
Bad Times: Cyclical Skill Mismatch and the Long-term Effects of Graduating 
in a Recession”. 
 
17/12 August, Alexander W. Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, 
«When do we lie?». 
 
18/12 September, Kjetil Bjorvatn and Tina Søreide, «Corruption and competition for 
resources”. 
 
19/12 September, Alexander W. Cappelen and Runa Urheim, “Pension Funds, 
Sovereign-wealth Funds and Intergenerational Justice” 
 
20/12 October, Ingvild Almås and Erik Ø. Sørensen, “Global Income Inequality and 
Cost-of-Living Adjustment: The Geary–Allen World Accounts”. 
 
21/12 November, Ingvild Almås and Åshild Auglænd Johnsen, “The cost of living 
and its implications for inequality and poverty for China”. 
 
22/12 December, Alexander W. Cappelen, Tom Eichele, Kenneth Hugdahl, Karsten 
Specht, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, “Fair inequality: a 
neureconomic study”. 
 
23/12 December, Ingvild Almås, Alexander W. Cappelen, Kjell G. Salvanes, Erik Ø. 
Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, «Willingness to compete: family matters». 
 
24/12 December, Ingvild Almås, Alexander W. Cappelen, Kjell G. Salvanes, Erik Ø. 
Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, «Willingness to compete in a gender equal 
society». 
 
 
Norges
Handelshøyskole
Norwegian School of Economics 
NHH
Helleveien 30
NO-5045 Bergen
Norway
Tlf/Tel: +47 55 95 90 00
Faks/Fax: +47 55 95 91 00
nhh.postmottak@nhh.no
www.nhh.no
